### 1ac – plan

#### PLAN

#### The United States federal government should normalize trade relations with Cuba.

### 1ac – ag

**CONTENTION 1 IS CUBAN AGRICULTURE**

#### Global industrial agriculture is unsustainable

\*global agriculture is unsustainable – other countries’ technology is insufficient, several reasons:

a. environmental degradation – industrial farming techniques use highly concentrated fertilizers and chemicals which cause soil erosion, destroy pollinating insects such as bees – makes collapse of crop yields inevitable

b. population growth – increases the burden on a finite food supply

c. peak oil – finite oil production makes current fossil-fuel driven industrial techniques unsustainable

**Peters 10 –** LL.M. expected 2011, University of Arkansas School of Law, Graduate Program in Agricultural and Food Law; J.D. 2010, University of Oregon School of Law (Kathryn, “Creating a Sustainable Urban Agriculture Revolution” J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 203, http://law.uoregon.edu/org/jell/docs/251/peters.pdf)

The U.S. agricultural system is becoming increasingly more concentrated, specialized, and industrialized.10 As of this writing, **ninety-eight percent** of the food supply in the United States is produced by agribusinesses running **industrial farms** that employ mechanically and chemically intensive farming methods for the maximization of profit.11 These farming methods are further encouraged through government subsidies, which operate to affect the supply and price of agricultural commodities.12 Government subsidies have tended to benefit large agribusinesses13 and have encouraged the use of chemical inputs and unsound farming practices, which maximize short-term yields and profits at the expense of the environment and small local farmers.14 An additional consequence of farm subsidies is the overproduction of commodity crops, which requires that the United States supplement its food supply with fruits and vegetables imported from other countries.15

Industrial agriculture in the United States has only been in place since the mid-twentieth century.16 Modern agricultural practices began with the Green Revolution, a response to world food shortages in the 1940s that sought to increase productivity of land by employing science-based technologies in agriculture.17 The Green Revolution was born in the 1950s and continued developing new farming methods through the 1970s; these methods include the engineering of high-yielding plants and the establishment of large, monocultural farms heavily reliant on chemical pesticides and fertilizers, mechanization, and irrigation.18 While the Green Revolution’s techniques were successful in increasing food production for several decades, the long-term effects of this method of farming on the environment, economy, and society are now evident: groundwater **contamination** from chemical pesticides and fertilizers; **soil erosion** and depletion of soil nutrients caused by unsound cropping practices; **destruction of necessary insects**, such as bees, from pollution and the indiscriminate use of pesticides; inherent **economic risks** stemming from reliance on monocrops; and side effects on humans from agrochemicals.19 Further, these agricultural methods have resulted in the loss of the family farm20 and many rural farmers have lost their livelihoods as human labor has been replaced by machinery.21

**Rapid population growth** will increasingly burden the planet’s food supply system. In 2008, United Nation’s Chief Ban Ki-moon told world leaders the following: “The world needs to produce more food. Food production needs to rise by 50 per cent [sic] by the year 2030 to meet the rising demand.”22 Unfortunately, the Green Revolution’s agricultural methods may have already reached their limits.23 Most fertile land is already cultivated and urban development trends threaten existing farmland;24 furthermore, the effects of **environmental degradation** are resulting in declining crop yields.25

**Peak oil**26 is yet another threat to the food supply system. Current agricultural practices in the United States are highly dependent on oil. Chemical fertilizers currently used in industrial agriculture are produced by an extremely energy-intensive process that combines hydrogen, which comes from fossil fuels, with nitrogen.27 The current U.S. food supply is also dependent upon fossil fuels for the processing, storage, and transportation of food.28 As the planet’s oil supply decreases, current fossil-fueled agricultural practices will cease to be viable and sufficient.

Industrial agricultural practices are also responsible for significant environmental degradation. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency attributes more than half of the pollution contaminating rivers and streams in the United States to farm runoff containing chemical fertilizers and pesticides as well as manure.29 “Dead zones,” oxygen-deprived coastal areas where deadly algae bloom, are attributed to agricultural runoff and are known to occur in the Gulf of Mexico and the Chesapeake Bay.30 Groundwater and soil are also contaminated by the vast amounts of chemicals dumped onto crops, and these chemicals ultimately destroy the soil’s natural fertility process.31 As soil fertility declines, industrial farms use ever-increasing amounts of chemical fertilizers to achieve consistent yields.32

Chemical pesticides are also used in ever-increasing amounts.33 As pests and insects become resistant to chemicals, industrial farmers must use increasingly lethal chemical pesticides.34 Furthermore, chemical pesticides are applied indiscriminately and beneficial insects are destroyed alongside harmful ones.35 Additionally, mechanized administration methods are harmfully imprecise; much of the administered pesticides never reach the plants but do reach surrounding soil and water.36 Thus, mechanized administration causes excessive contamination of the soil and water without providing a countervailing benefit to the crops.37

Industrial monocultural farming focuses on large-scale production of a single crop; as a result, land is overcultivated, crops are not rotated, and cover crops that protect topsoil between growing seasons are not employed.38 Monocultural farming practices have many negative consequences, including soil erosion, depletion of soil nutrients, loss of biodiversity, extinction of natural enemies, increased agricultural waste, and increased use of chemicals.39 Monoculture practices also upset the natural balance of the planet’s ecosystems.40 When we upset the balance of ecosystems, the long-term effects of these disturbances may not be realized for many years, and at that point it will be too late to reverse the damage.

Industrial, monocultural agriculture systems are also threatened by climate zone shifts brought on by greenhouse gas emissions.41 Climate change will reduce water sources, raise sea levels resulting in flooding of coastal land, and dry the interiors of the northern continents.42 Flooding and drought conditions will stress agricultural systems, and food shortages will likely ensue.43 Industrial monoculture farms require intensive investment into land development, irrigation, and equipment.44 As climate change continues, many monoculture farms will no longer be suitable for producing the single crops they were designed to produce.45 Diverse, multidimensional agricultural systems will allow for the adaptation of crop and farming practices in response to rapidly changing climate conditions and will help to ensure food security.

#### Cuba’s model of urban agriculture is a sustainable alternative

\*urban farming is a sustainable model for global adaptation –

a. solves environmental crises – reduced mechanization of food production reduces carbon emissions and introduces crop rotation which solves soil erosion, also offsets warming by increasing breadth of vegetation to absorb CO2

b. solves food security – utilizes urban spaces to reduce its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity allowing more food production

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While urban agriculture was a response to a dramatic crisis in Cuba’s history, through the development of a community-based system of cultivation on previously vacant lots employing organic farming techniques, Cuba has created a sustainable food production system.189 As of 2005, Havana was producing over ninety percent of the perishable produce consumed in its city as well as a significant portion of its milk and meat.190 With government support, the urban gardens have become a profitable economic enterprise for many Cubans.191 Local access to fresh foods has added diversity to the Cuban diet and reduced the carbon footprint associated with its food supply by reducing the transportation and chemical input required to grow and transport the food.192 The development of **urban farming** has also **ensured food security** for Cuba.193 The success of Cuba’s system has established the country as a **model** for the urban production of **sustainable agriculture around the world**.194

In transitioning to a sustainable urban agricultural system, Cuba has drastically reduced its harmful impacts on the environment. Cubans have been able to significantly reduce their carbon footprints as their food supply is no longer shipped across oceans and Cuban residents can walk to local markets for fresh produce rather than drive to grocery stores.195 Reduced mechanization in food production further reduces carbon emissions. Increased urban vegetation also mitigates the impact of climate change because vegetation has a cooling effect when air temperatures are high.196 Because much of Cuba’s urban land is now vegetative, surface temperatures in Cuba may remain cooler due to the thermoregulation created by the vegetation cover.197

According to Dr. Nelso Camponioni Concepción, the Cuban government, through its urban agricultural program, aims “to gain the most food from every square meter of available space.”198 By utilizing available urban space for sustainable food production, Cuba is reducing its impact on the planet’s carrying capacity. The organic urban gardening techniques do not consume greenspace or harm the environment; therefore, measuring the true cost of externalities is not an issue. The growth of the urban gardens has created an increasing food supply and a new economy for many Cubans without negatively impacting the environment or society.

#### The plan solves–

#### First, the plan spreads organoponic production, revitalizing urban spaces

\*exports organoponic production – Cuba urban farming is a decentralized production model which is cost-attractive because of the lack of expensive technology associated with industrial farming which makes private companies incentivized to adopt the model

\*plan spills over world-wide – US adoption of technology makes urban farming cheaper and more easily adopted

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VI. New Opportunities

While investment in Cuban businesses and sales or purchases of Cuban products must still move through official channels under the joint venture law or other Cuban programs, the time is ripe for organizations in the United States to begin laying groundwork for closer ties with Cuban agricultural entities. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future trade opportunities. n161

As previously mentioned, recent changes in U.S. policy now allow for any individual in the United States, not simply relatives, to donate money to Cuban citizens, though not to exceed $ 500 for any three month consecutive period, with the only restriction being that the recipient is not an official in the Cuban [\*704] government or the Communist Party. n162 Specifically written into these new regulations is the idea that these remittances may be spent "to support the development of private businesses." n163 A five hundred dollar infusion of capital to support a fledging business or farm can be enormously beneficial when the average monthly salary is only 448 pesos, or approximately twenty dollars. n164

Additional capital will enable small Cuban farms to expand operations by hiring additional help or perhaps purchasing additional farm animals. While purchasing a tractor may seem like an obvious choice for a growing farm, Medardo Naranjo Valdes of the Organoponico Vivero Alamar, a UBPC just outside of Havana, indicated that farm animals such as oxen would remain the preferred choice for the foreseeable future on the small and midsized farms that make up the majority of the newer agricultural cooperatives. n165 Not only do farm animals not require gasoline or incur maintenance costs beyond perhaps an occasional veterinarian charge, their waste can be used as fertilizer.

Apart from additional labor, funds provided to agricultural cooperatives could be put to use in developing innovative pest control techniques that do not require the use of expensive pesticides or other chemicals. The Vivero Alamar is currently experimenting with a variety of natural pest control techniques such as introducing plants that serve as natural repellents to insects and the introduction of other insects that feed on harmful pests without harming the crops. n166

Investment in agricultural cooperatives done in this manner will likely fail to see much return on the investment for their foreseeable future, until policies in both the United States and Cuba are changed. n167 For a relatively small sum, American investors will get not only the benefit of a close relationship with a Cuban farm that will become a new source of both import and export business in the future, but potentially gain access to **innovative agricultural techniques** that could be used in the United States **immediately**. n168

Because the logistical structure needed to transport goods from large rural farms into city markets remains underdeveloped, urban and suburban agriculture makes up a growing portion of the food produced and consumed in Cuba. n169 As in other countries, the population trends in Cuba have continued to shift away from rural areas to more concentrated urban and suburban areas, with about [\*705] three-fourths of Cubans living in cities. n170 With this shift in population has also come a shift in the country's agricultural system. As of 2007, about 15% of all agriculture in Cuba could be classified as urban agriculture. n171 Not only have agricultural practices changed, but eating habits have as well. Without the Soviet Union to provide a ready source of income and the machinery needed to engage in large-scale livestock production, vegetable consumption has increased dramatically. n172 Nearly every urban area has direct access to a wide variety of locally grown, organic produce. n173

Many of the urban farms in Cuba, including the Vivero Alamar, make use of organoponics, a system where crops are produced in raised beds of soil on land that would otherwise be incapable of supporting intensive agricultural production. n174 Many of these raised beds can be constructed in a concentrated area to support a wide variety of produce, with the typical organoponic garden covering anywhere from one half to several hectares in size. n175 The rise of the organoponic production method was a shift away from the earlier **centralized production** model employed by the state. It has been supported through intensive research and development by a variety of state agencies, such as the National Institute of Agricultural Science, and continued development has been guided through intensive training and educational programs. n176

The organoponic system is not limited in its application to Cuban urban farms, but maintains **potential to be applied worldwide**, including in the United States. Urban agriculture in Cuba revitalized and put to use previously abandoned and unused land. A similar approach could be applied to the United States as a means to restore blighted areas. n177 Applying Cuban-derived organoponics in U.S. cities could potentially open up an enormous amount of land that was previously unusable. From a business perspective, investing in an organoponic agricultural program in the United States is also a sound decision since the demand for local produce reached $ 4.8 billion in 2008 and is only expected to grow further, potentially reaching $ 7 billion in 2012. n178 [\*706]

In an American city beset with high unemployment such as Detroit, Michigan, for example, investing in urban agriculture could potentially generate as many as five thousand new jobs. n179 By utilizing Cuba's system of organoponics, the need to use expensive and complex farm machinery could be significantly reduced. Already companies in the United States, such as Farmscape Gardens in southern California, recognize what Cuba's organoponic system could achieve and have integrated it into their business practices. n180 Rachel Bailin, a partner in the company, indicated that it was Cuba's organic farming practices that helped inspire them to start a company devoted to urban agriculture. n181 They have already used Cuba's organoponic farming methods to produce more than 50,000 pounds of produce since the spring of 2009. n182 The potential for future growth in this industry is huge, as Farmscape Gardens' current levels of production make it the largest urban agriculture company in the state of California. n183

Cuba not only offers attractive prospects for trading in the future, but methods of agriculture pioneered out of necessity have broad prospects if applied to agriculture in the United States. As the demand for locally grown produce continues to increase, a cost-effective and proven agricultural model like Cuba's organoponic system may be just what is needed to allow for urban agriculture to flourish.

#### Second, access to the US export market spreads the Cuban model

\*access to the US export model spreads Cuba’s model – gives Cuba a significant price advantage and quickly transforms the US into a foreign exchange corner through market diversity

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http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume14/pdfs/kost.pdf)

In addition to the above European markets, the successful expansion and viability of Cuba’s organic production may also depend on access to geographically-close, high-income foreign markets, namely the United States and Canada. Currently, Cuban produce is not certified-organic in either of these markets. Only after Cuban products are certified for these countries could Cuba legally export produce labeled organic to these markets. Given that many technical production practices currently followed by Cuban producers are potentially compatible with U.S. certification standards and given Cuba’s prior experience in becoming Swiss-certified, Cuba could be well positioned to meet U.S. certification standards.

For the U.S. organic market, in addition to a lifting of the U.S. embargo, Cuba would have to be certified by a USDA-accredited certification program that assures U.S. markets that Cuban products labeled organic meet all National Organic Program standards and regulations under the U.S. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990. If the U.S. embargo on Cuba were lifted, Cuban exports, once certified, could play a significant role in the U.S. organic market. In this current U.S. niche market, production costs are high. Opening the U.S. market would enable Cuba to exploit its **significant comparative advantage** in this area. This market could become a quick foreign exchange earner for Cuba. The largest barrier Cuba faces in expanding into the U.S. organic market will be meeting U.S. requirements for organic certification.

Tapping the U.S. market may create **sufficient price incentives** for Cuban producers to take the necessary steps to meet the organic standards of other importing countries. Cuba could then expand production of organic produce geared to these specialty export markets. With sufficiently high prices for organic produce, urban labor may remain active in an organic urban gardening sector. Most likely, the viability of a vibrant organic produce production and processing sector in Cuba will depend on Cuba’s gaining access to the large, nearby U.S. market. Without such access, organic-oriented production of horticultural products in Cuba will likely remain a necessity-driven way to produce food for domestic consumption in an environment where other production approaches are just not available.

#### Third, normalizing trade relations gives preferential status to Cuban exports – no risk of a link turn

\*no risk of link turns – giving Cuba preferential status means the US can’t outcompete Cuban exports because Cuba’s imports and exports are given preference in agriculture markets making it harder for private markets to outcompete Cuba

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Cuba's private farmers are an entrepreneurial class with growing disposable income. Cuba buys imported foreign goods, including new automobiles (now also legal), and are eager to sell its agricultural products to the United States. Sadly, Cuban agricultural products are still banned from import into the USA. Cuban private farmers and businessmen think this is ironic considering that the U.S. has exported nearly USD four billion worth of food and agricultural products to Cuba since 2001.

While the U.S. will undoubtedly seek to help stabilize Cuba economically when relations are ultimately normalized, it will be constrained by Washington's massive budget deficit and significantly reduced foreign aid allocations. Official U.S. policy is to encourage the growth of Cuba's private sector as a means of developing democratic institutions.

The U.S. government could concretely help the development of Cuba's private sector - at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer by introducing legislation that would allow **preferential market access** for Cuban agricultural products before the official end of the trade embargo against Havana. This most likely would require that the U.S. implement preferential (including protected) trade access for the island's products, which are of agricultural origin and would not compete with products traditionally grown in the U.S.

The U.S. has a history of providing development assistance and preferential trade access to developing countries, particularly to its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. Several existing programs offer special access to the U.S. market for certain agricultural and manufactured goods from developing countries. Specifically, the U.S. has developed a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), in addition to several regional preferential trade programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Preference program and the African Growth and Opportunity program.

The President retains ultimate decision-making authority as to which countries and products are eligible for GSP status. There are certain mandatory criteria that countries must measure up to in order to be considered eligible for GSP treatment. Of particular interest with respect to Cuba, communist countries are not eligible for GSP treatment "unless the country receives Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status , is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is not dominated by international communism."[1] In addition, a GSP beneficiary "may not have nationalized, expropriated or otherwise seized property of U.S. citizens or corporations without providing, or taking steps to provide, prompt, adequate and effective compensation, or submitting such issues to a mutually agreed forum for arbitration."[2]

While certain products from Cuba would certainly be eligible for GSP status, the mandatory country requirements present additional hurdles for preferential trade treatment for Havana to qualify outside of the current political climate. However, these are not insurmountable. For example, Cuba repeatedly has offered to negotiate the settlement of claims for expropriated U.S. property, and since the demise of the Soviet Union, could not be considered to be dominated by "international communism".

In addition to the GSP, the U.S. also has implemented several regional preferential trade programs for certain Central American and Caribbean countries known collectively as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). Much like the GSP, the CBI was intended to encourage economic development and export diversification throughout the countries of the Caribbean Basin by providing trade and tariff benefits. However, such benefits were denied to any country deemed to be under the control of communists.

President Clinton signed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 to increase trade and investment with Sub-Sahara Africa. In addition, the program sought to "stimulate economic growth, to promote a high-level dialogue on trade and investment-related issues, to encourage economic integration, and to facilitate sub-Saharan Africa's integration into the global economy." As of now, 38 sub-Saharan African countries are eligible for preferential treatment under the AGOA. In addition to the 4,600 products already eligible for the GSP, the AGOA adds 1,800 products which may receive favorable treatment from this category of countries. Most agricultural products are included in these lists.

AGOA beneficiaries are eligible for substantial trade preferences that, in addition to the preferences provided by the GSP, permit marketable goods produced in AGOA countries to enter the U.S. duty-free. The U.S. government, in seeking to encourage and assist AGOA countries, established four regional trade hubs through which it provides assistance to governments and businesses seeking to export to the U.S. market.

Similar to other preferential trade programs, the U.S. President determines on an annual basis whether sub-Saharan countries are eligible for their participation based on certain criteria. Such criteria, including the demonstration of progress toward the creation of a market-based economy, the establishment of the rule of law, and the enactment of beneficial economic policies to reduce poverty, protect internationally recognized worker rights and fight corruption. Given these criteria, Cuba could be eligible for an AGOA-type of preferential program for its agricultural exports.

Both the U.S. and Cuba were parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the WTO. In 1962, the Cuban government was notified that the GATT would impose economic sanctions pursuant to Article XXI of the GATT, Security Exceptions. The U.S. invoked this article to revoke Cuba's preferential sugar tariff and access to the U.S. market. As a result, the U.S. denied Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status to Cuba.

MFN is a guiding principle of the GATT. It requires that member countries not discriminate in the way in which they treat WTO partners. Article I of the GATT states "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.

The U.S. is currently exempt from having to provide the MFN status to Cuba pursuant to Article XXI. However, if the U.S. were to resume normal trade relations with Cuba, it would be required to extend Cuba to no less favorable treatment than is given to every other country in the WTO, pursuant to this MFN principle. Article II of the GATT states, Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this agreement.[3] Thus, the U.S. would be required to provide Cuba with the MFN rate of duty provided in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS).

It follows that the granting of MFN status to Cuba would result in Cuba having the same rights of access to the U.S. market as all other countries. In the event that Cuba requests access to the sugar trade-rate quota (TRQ), the U.S. would be required to comply with this request pursuant to the WTO rule that all countries with a "substantial interest in supplying a product' be allocated a portion of the TRQ.'"

To date, the WTO has used the "10% share" rule to establish a "substantial interest."[4] This means that countries with the ability to service at least 10 percent of the import market are to be considered for allocation. In addition, if countries that supply less than 10 percent of the import market are given a portion of the TRQ, then all countries capable of providing any portion of the import market share are to be considered. The U.S. has historically assigned part of the TRQ to countries that provided less than 1 percent of the import share. Thus, even if Cuba is unable to provide 10 percent of the market for sugar, it would still be considered to have a "substantial interest" and thus would be granted access to the TRQ.

At this point, the U.S. would have several options to determine the TRQ for Cuban sugar and other products. As there have been no recent official trade statistics, the U.S. could argue that there was little recent history on which to base an appropriate TRQ allocation for Cuban products. The U.S. could then open a competitive bidding process to reset country-specific quotas or it could simply reduce current TRQs and provide a portion of the market share to Cuba. It could also increase the overall TRQ for certain products.

As the U.S. has implemented several broad preferential trade programs aimed at increasing economic development throughout the developing world, it seems likely that Cuba could be included in such a program upon the resumption of normal trade relations. The trend seems to be to enter into such bilateral or regional free trade agreements as a means of reducing barriers to trade within the principles of the GATT and WTO.

Cuba would also presumably be eligible for membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which would allow preferential access to Cuban agricultural products.

The U.S. historically has been among the world's foremost proponents of free trade. It therefore seems unjust that we freely export billions of dollars of U.S. agricultural products to Cuba, yet ban its imports even though it are largely produced by the private sector. A strong argument could therefore be made that the best means of assisting Cuba at minimal cost to the U.S. would be to implement preferential (including protected) trade access for the island's products which are of agricultural origin and would not compete with products actually grown in the U.S.

#### This prevents the collapse of US agriculture

\*prevents collapse of US agriculture – current industrial farming methods are terminally unsustainable a paradigm shift is critical to shifting to successful agricultural practices

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An adequate food supply is **essential for the survival of the human race**. Historically, the U.S. food system has been one of abundance. However, degradation of the environment, climate change, dependence on foreign oil and food imports, urban development trends, and increased demand due to population growth and the emerging biofuel industry2 all threaten our food supply. In response to these threats, local-food and sustainable agriculture movements have recently formed to raise awareness of the need to pursue alternatives to the current system.3 In 2009, the White House acknowledged the importance of changing the way we grow food by planting an organic garden on its grounds.4 In the wake of the economic crisis of 2008, victory gardens, which were first made popular during the World War II era, have reemerged and created additional awareness of the need to pursue food production alternatives.5 Victory gardens and local sustainable agriculture reduce dependency on the established food production system, but, because the U.S. population is clustered in densely populated metropolitan areas,6 the majority of the population currently lacks access to land on which to grow food.

In the face of environmental, economic, and social equity challenges, it is imperative that the government, at federal, state, and local levels, establish policies that promote sustainable urban agriculture to ensure access to an adequate food supply produced with minimal impact on the environment. Environmental threats stemming from climate change and the depletion and degradation of natural resources will increasingly impact the planet’s food production system.7 The current economic crisis has increased the burden on the government to provide relief in the forms of unemployment compensation8 and supplemental nutrition assistance.9 An inherent consequence of the economic crisis is a widening disparity between the rich and poor and increased social inequity between the socioeconomic classes in America. Establishing a sustainable urban agricultural system would reduce the environmental degradation that is caused by modern agricultural practices, reduce the financial strain on government resources by increasing urban productivity and enabling urbanites to grow a local food supply, and reduce socioeconomic disparities by providing less-advantaged populations in urban areas with access to an adequate supply of fresh, nutritious food.

#### Three impacts–

#### First, industrial agriculture crushes the environment and bio-diversity, threatening extinction

\*industrial agricultural practices cause extinction – depletes scarce resources, overexploits agricultural areas and spurs resource wars – polluting fertilizer causes soil erosion collapsing the environment – makes extinction inevitable

**Ehrlich & Ehrlich 13 –** Professor of Biology & Senior Research Scientist in Biology @ Stanford University (Paul R. Ehrlich (President of the Center for Conservation Biology @ Stanford University) & Anne H. Ehrlich, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?,” Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences, Proc. R. Soc. B 2013 280, published online 9 January 2013)//HA

Virtually every past civilization has eventually undergone collapse, a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a dramatic decline in population size [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most, cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an ultimate cause [3].

But today, for the first time, **humanity’s global civilization**—the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with **collapse** byan array of **environmental problems.** Humankind finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4], facing what the UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘perfect storm’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating **extinction** of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity.

The human predicament is driven by **overpopulation**, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily **environmentally damaging tech**nologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human population size now is above the planet’s long-term carrying capacity is suggested (conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today’s population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization’s life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with nonlinear responses [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth’s carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26]

2. Do current trends portend a collapse?

What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more gradual breakdown because famines, epidemics and resource shortages cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with disruptions of trade and conflicts over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear. pg. 1-2

### 1ac – multilateralism

**CONTENTION 2 IS MULTILATERALISM**

#### Anti-americanism and unilateral military policies are decimating US legitimacy, threating the American international system- that causes excess interventions and great power wars

\*unilateralism fails –

a. power dilution – arms trade has fallen to NGOs, international organizations are too cumbersome and beaten by small regional alliances, GONGOs are resulting in proxy soft-power competition

b. small state backlash – international norms created by unipolarity cause diffusion of power to smaller states with vetoes that they can use to control us in international institutions

c. economic multipolarity – strong economic globalization means other countries have enough influence to American goals

\*unilateralism causes great power wars via aggressive intervention – military power creates the temptation of policymakers to use it—hegemons are inevitably more aggressive and that leads to adventurism – policymakers have incentives to engage in threat construction and greatly exaggerate threats that allow intervention – Iraq proves

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In an election season, such talk rolls easily off the tongue. But Romney's hackneyed rhetoric is woefully out of step -- both with an American electorate hungry for a less costly brand of foreign policy and with a world in the midst of tectonic change. A sharp **economic downturn** and **expensive, inconclusive conflicts** in Iraq and Afghanistan have left Americans ready for a focus on the home front. Abroad, the charge for the next U.S. president can hardly be to stick his head in the sand and deny that the global distribution of power is fast changing. On the contrary, it is to react soberly and steadily to the implications of such change and ensure that the United States remains secure and prosperous even as economic and military strength spreads to new quarters.

President Barack Obama is on the correct path. Leaving Iraq and overseeing a paced withdrawal from Afghanistan will bring U.S. commitments back into line with U.S. interests. Special operations and drone strikes have proved far more effective in fighting al Qaeda than has occupying countries in the Middle East and South Asia, and an offshore posture in the Persian Gulf is the best way to deal with Iran. Amid **China's rise** and the **economic dynamism** building in its neighborhood, Obama is right to downsize the U.S. presence in Europe and orchestrate a strategic "pivot" to East Asia. The move constitutes a necessary hedge against Chinese ambition and ensures that American workers will benefit from expanding markets in the Pacific Rim. These policies will enable the United States to simultaneously adjust to a shifting global landscape, husband its resources, and grow its economy -- facilitating the president's pledge to focus on "nation-building here at home."

Romney has already denigrated Obama's pragmatism, charging that "our president thinks America is in decline." Obama shot back in his State of the Union address on Jan. 24 that "anyone who tells you that America is in decline … doesn't know what they're talking about." Obama decidedly has the upper hand in this back-and-forth. He recognizes that, the country's strengths notwithstanding, U.S. strategy must adjust to a world in which power will be more broadly distributed. And his focus on rebuilding the American economy speaks directly to an electorate yearning for more equity and prosperity at home.

According to a recent Pew Research Center survey, **46 percent of Americans** want the United States to "mind its own business," and 76 percent think the country should "concentrate more on our own national problems" than on foreign challenges. These are high numbers by historical standards -- a clear indication that the **electorate** is hurting economically and wary of **strategic overreach**. Romney should take note. His chest-thumping talk of a new American century still plays well in some quarters. But Obama's commitment to nation-building at home will play even better.

Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership. But the country's exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities.

China's GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank predicts that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. The United States will no doubt exit the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead. Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable.

To be sure, America's military superiority will remain second to none for decades to come. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made amply clear, though, military primacy hardly ensures effective influence. And with the **U.S. defense budget poised to shrink** in the service of restoring the country's fiscal health, the United States will have to pick its fights carefully. Shrewd and judicious statecraft will be at least as important as raw power in ensuring the country's security.

To acknowledge the need for the United States to adjust to prospective shifts in the global distribution of power is not, as Duke University professor Bruce Jentleson recently pointed out in Democracy, to be a declinist or a pessimist. It is to be a realist. And safely guiding the United States through this coming transition requires seeing the world as it is rather than retreating toward the illusory comfort of denial.

Adjusting to the rise of the rest requires, for starters, making more room at the table for newcomers. That process is already well under way. The G-20 has supplanted the G-8, widening the circle for global consultations. In the aftermath of reforms adopted in 2010, developing countries now have enhanced weight at the World Bank and IMF. The enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, though currently bogged down in wrangling, is also in the offing.

But making international institutions more representative is the easy part. More challenging will be managing the ideological diversity that will accompany the coming realignment in global power. Precisely because the United States is an exceptional nation, its version of liberal democracy may well prove to be the exception, not the rule.

In China, Russia, and the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, state-led brands of capitalism are holding their own -- and may well do so for the foreseeable future. The Arab Spring could finally bring democratic rule to at least some countries in the Middle East, but it is also breeding political Islam; democratization should not be mistaken for Westernization. Even emerging powers that are already democracies, such as India, Brazil, and Turkey, are charting their own paths. They regularly break with the United States and Europe on trade, Middle East diplomacy, military intervention, the environment, and other issues, preferring to side with other ascending states, whether democratic or not. Romney's paeans to American power are no excuse for his silence on how he plans to manage these complexities.

Promoting international stability will grow more demanding as rising powers bring to the table their differing conceptions of order and governance. The United States has a key role to play in managing such diversity and channeling it toward cooperative ends. Overheated proclamations of American preeminence, however, will do more harm than good. If a new, consensual international order is to emerge, rising powers must be treated as stakeholders in that order, not merely as objects of American power.

Shepherding the transition to this more pluralistic world is arguably the defining challenge facing U.S. statecraft in the years ahead. Romney appears ready to pave over this challenge by denying that such change is afoot and attempting to portray Obama's policies as "an eloquently justified surrender of world leadership."

Obama should welcome this debate and refuse to let his opponents hide behind the veil of American exceptionalism. Democrats no longer need to feel vulnerable on national security; Obama has demonstrated smarts and strength on many issues, including the degradation of al Qaeda, the pivot to Asia, and the isolation of Iran. He understands that agile, firm diplomacy backed by American power will do much more for the United States than congratulatory talk of American primacy.

A smarter, more selective, and less costly U.S. role in the world would not only help the United States get its own house in order, but also give rising powers the wider berth they seek. And good policy would also be good politics; Americans are keen to share with others the burdens and responsibilities of international engagement. The world desperately needs a brand of U.S. leadership that focuses not on ruling the roost, but on guiding a more diverse and unwieldy globe to consensus and cooperation.

#### The impact is global conflict escalation

Brooks, et al, 13 [Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment Stephen G. Brooks [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back), G. John Ikenberry [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back) and William C. Wohlforth [(bio)](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#back), Stephen G. Brooks; G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth STEPHEN G. BROOKS is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. WILLIAM C. WOHLFORTH is Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security ¶ [Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/toc/ins.37.3.html), p. Project Muse]

¶ Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ Even if deep engagement's costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy's major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States' security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars.¶ A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence **of a far** [End Page 33] **more dangerous global security environment**. For one thing, as noted above, the United States' overseas presence gives it the leverage to **restrain partners** from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the "American Pacifier" is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.72¶ How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia's security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge.¶ The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions.[73](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f73) Defensive realists maintain that the high expected [End Page 34] costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia's major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier.¶ Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays.74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers.¶ What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington—notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region's prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and [End Page 35] Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States.[75](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f75)¶ The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism's sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism's optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives.76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.[77](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f77) In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices.¶ To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world's key regions. We have already [End Page 36] mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war).¶ Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world's core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States.¶ Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces.78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem.[79](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f79) Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate [End Page 37] over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows.80 Moreover, the risk of "unforeseen crisis dynamics" that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome.¶ The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and "pass the buck" to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century.¶ The problem is that China's rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, "The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves."[81](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f81) [End Page 38] Therefore, unless China's rise stalls, "the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War."82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia—just what the United States is doing.[83](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f83)¶ In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difficult.¶ Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States' formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the "focused enmity" [End Page 39] of the United States.84 All of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America's alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking.[85](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f85)¶ In the end, therefore, deep engagement reduces security competition and does so in a way that slows the diffusion of power away from the United States. This in turn makes it easier to sustain the policy over the long term.¶ The Wider Benefits of Deep Engagement¶ The case against deep engagement overstates its costs and underestimates its security benefits. Perhaps its most important weakness, however, is that its preoccupation with security issues diverts attention from some of deep engagement's most important benefits: sustaining the global economy and fostering institutionalized cooperation in ways advantageous to U.S. national interests.¶ Economic Benefits¶ Deep engagement is based on a premise central to realist scholarship from E.H. Carr to Robert Gilpin: economic orders do not just emerge spontaneously; they are created and sustained by and for powerful states.86 To be sure, the sheer size of its economy would guarantee the United States a significant role in the politics of the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the fact that it is the leading military power and security provider also enables economic leadership. The security role figures in the creation, maintenance, and expansion of the system. In part because other states—including all but one of the world's largest economies—were heavily dependent on U.S. security protection during the Cold War, the United States was able not only to foster the economic order but also to prod other states to buy into it and to support plans for its progressive expansion.[87](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f87) Today, as the discussion in the [End Page 40] previous section underscores, the security commitments of deep engagement support the global economic order by reducing the likelihood of security dilemmas, arms racing, instability, regional conflicts and, in extremis, major power war. In so doing, the strategy helps to maintain a stable and comparatively open world economy—a long-standing U.S. national interest.¶ In addition to ensuring the global economy against important sources of insecurity, the extensive set of U.S. military commitments and deployments helps to protect the "global economic commons." One key way is by helping to keep sea-lanes and other shipping corridors freely available for commerce.88 A second key way is by helping to establish and protect property/sovereignty rights in the oceans. Although it is not the only global actor relevant to protecting the global economic commons, the United States has by far the most important role given its massive naval superiority and the leadership role it plays in international economic institutions. If the United States were to pull back from the world, protecting the global economic commons would likely be much harder to accomplish for a number of reasons: cooperating with other nations on these matters would be less likely to occur; maintaining the relevant institutional foundations for promoting this goal would be harder; and preserving access to bases throughout the world—which is needed to accomplish this mission—would likely be curtailed to some degree.¶ Advocates of retrenchment agree that a flourishing global economy is an important U.S. interest, but they are largely silent on the role U.S. grand strategy plays in sustaining it.[89](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f89) For their part, many scholars of international political [End Page 41] economy have long argued that economic openness might continue even in the absence of hegemonic leadership.90 Yet this does not address the real question of interest: Does hegemonic leadership make the continuation of global economic stability more likely? The voluminous literature contains no analysis that suggests a negative answer; what scholars instead note is that the likelihood of overcoming problems of collective action, relative gains, and incomplete information drops in the absence of leadership.[91](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f91) It would thus take a bold if not reckless leader to run a grand experiment to determine whether the global economy can continue to expand in the absence of U.S. leadership.¶ Deep engagement not only helps to underwrite the global economy in a general sense, but it also allows the United States to structure it in ways that serve the United States' narrow economic interests. Carla Norrlof argues persuasively that America disproportionately benefits from the current structure of the global economy, and that its ability to reap these advantages is directly tied to its position of military preeminence within the system.92 One way this occurs is via "microlevel structuring"—that is, the United States gets better economic bargains or increased economic cooperation on some specific issues than it would if it did not play such a key security role. As Joseph Nye observes, [End Page 42] "Even if the direct use of force were banned among a group of countries, military force would still play an important political role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."[93](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f93) Although Nye is right that such linkage will generally be implicit, extensive analyses of declassified documents by historians shows that the United States directly used its overseas security commitments and military deployments to convince allies to change their economic policies to its benefit during the Cold War.94¶ The United States' security commitments continue to bolster the pursuit of its economic interests. Interviews with current and past U.S. administration officials reveal wide agreement that alliance ties help gain favorable outcomes on trade and other economic issues. To the question, "Does the alliance system pay dividends for America in nonsecurity areas, such as economic relations?," the typical answer in interviews is "an unequivocal yes."[95](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f95) U.S. security commitments sometimes enhance bargaining leverage over the specific terms of economic agreements and give other governments more general incentives to enter into agreements that benefit the United States economically—two recent examples being the 2012 Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and the United States-Australia FTA (which entered into force in 2005).96 Officials across administrations of different parties stress that the desire of Korea and Australia to tighten their security relationships with the United States was a core reason why Washington was able to enter into free [End Page 43] trade agreements with them and to do so on terms favorable to U.S. economic interests. As one former official indicates, "The KORUS FTA—and I was involved in the initial planning—was attractive to Korea in large measure because it would help to underpin the US-ROK [South Korea] alliance at a time of shifting power in the region."[97](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f97) Korean leaders' interest in maintaining a strong security relationship with the United States, another former official stressed, made them more willing to be flexible regarding the terms of the agreement because "failure would look like a setback to the political and security relationship. Once we got into negotiations with the ROK, look at how many times we reneged even after we signed a deal. . . . We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses and the Koreans took it all."98¶ U.S. security leverage is economically beneficial in a second respect: it can facilitate "macrolevel structuring" of the global economy. Macrolevel structuring is crucial because so much of what the United States wants from the economic order is simply "more of the same"—it prefers the structure of the main international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund; it prefers the existence of "open regionalism" [99](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f99); it prefers the dollar as the reserve currency; and so on. U.S. interests are thus well served to the extent that American allies favor the global economic status quo rather than revisions that could be harmful to U.S. economic interests. One reason they are often inclined to take this approach is because of their security relationship with the United States. For example, interviews with U.S. officials stress that alliance ties give Washington leverage and authority in the current struggle over multilateral governance institutions in Asia. As one official noted, "On the economic side, the existence of the security alliance contributes to an atmosphere of trust that enables the United States and Japan to present a united front on shared economic goals—such as open markets and transparency, for example, through APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]."100 Likewise, Japan's current interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important long-term economic initiative in East Asia, is widely understood to be shaped less by specific Japanese [End Page 44] economic interests than by the belief of Yoshihiko Noda's administration that it will strengthen alliance ties with the United States.[101](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f101) As one former administration official stressed, this enhanced allied interest in supporting U.S. favored economic frameworks as a means of strengthening security ties with the United States helps to ensure against any shift to "a Sino-centric/ nontransparent/more mercantilist economic order in Asia."102¶ The United States' security leverage over its allies matters even if it is not used actively to garner support for its conception of the global economy and other economic issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by the status of the dollar as the reserve currency, which confers major benefits on the United States.[103](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f103) For many analysts, the U.S. position as the leading superpower with worldwide security commitments is an important reason why the dollar was established as the reserve currency and why it is likely to retain this status for a long time.104 In the past, Washington frequently used direct security leverage to get its allies to support the dollar.[105](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f105) There are a number of subtler mechanisms, however, through which the current U.S. geopolitical position serves the same end. First, Kathleen McNamara builds on the logic of focal points to argue that the U.S. global military role bolsters the likelihood that the dollar will long continue to be the currency that actors converge upon as the "'natural' dominant currency."106 Second, Norrlof emphasizes the significance of a mechanism that U.S. officials also stress: the United States' geopolitical position gives it the ability to constrain certain forms of Asian regionalism that, if they were to eventuate, could help to promote movement away from the dollar. [107](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f107) Third, Adam Posen emphasizes that the EU's security dependence on the United States makes it less likely that the euro countries will develop a true [End Page 45] global military capacity and thus "that the dollar will continue to benefit from the geopolitical sources of its global role" in ways that the euro countries will never match.108¶ In sum, the United States is a key pillar of the global economy, but it does not provide this service for free: it also extracts disproportionate benefits. Undertaking retrenchment would place these benefits at risk.¶ Institutional Benefits¶ What goes for the global economy also applies to larger patterns of institutionalized cooperation. Here, too, the leadership enabled by the United States' grand strategy fosters cooperation that generates diffuse benefits for many states but often disproportionately reflects U.S. preferences. This basic premise subsumes three claims.¶ First, benefits flow to the United States from institutionalized cooperation to address a wide range of problems. There is general agreement that a stable, open, and loosely rule-based international order serves the interests of the United States. Indeed, we are aware of no serious studies suggesting that U.S. interests would be better advanced in a world that is closed (i.e., built around blocs and spheres of influence) and devoid of basic, agreed-upon rules and institutions. As scholars have long argued, under conditions of rising complex interdependence, states often can benefit from institutionalized cooperation.[109](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f109)¶ In the security realm, newly emerging threats arguably are producing a rapid rise in the benefits of such cooperation for the United States. Some of these threats are transnational and emerge from environmental, health, and resource vulnerabilities, such as those concerning pandemics. Transnational nonstate groups with various capacities for violence have also become salient in recent decades, including groups involved in terrorism, piracy, and organized crime.110 [End Page 46] As is widely argued, these sorts of nontraditional, transnational threats can be realistically addressed only through various types of collective action.[111](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f111) Unless countries are prepared to radically restrict their integration into an increasingly globalized world system, the problems must be solved through coordinated action. 112 In the face of these diffuse and shifting threats, the United States is going to find itself needing to work with other states to an increasing degree, sharing information, building capacities, and responding to crises.[113](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f113)¶ Second, U.S. leadership increases the prospects that such cooperation will emerge in a manner relatively favorable to U.S. interests. Of course, the prospects for cooperation are partly a function of compatible interests. Yet even when interests overlap, scholars of all theoretical stripes have established that institutionalized cooperation does not emerge effortlessly: generating agreement on the particular cooperative solution can often be elusive. And when interests do not overlap, the bargaining becomes tougher yet: not just how, but whether cooperation will occur is on the table. Many factors affect the initiation of cooperation, and under various conditions states can and have cooperated without hegemonic leadership.114 As noted above, however, scholars acknowledge that **the likelihood of cooperation drops in the absence of leadership**.¶ Finally, U.S. security commitments are an integral component of this leadership. Historically, as Gilpin and other theorists of hegemonic order have shown, the background security and stability that the United States provided facilitated the creation of multilateral institutions for ongoing cooperation across policy areas.[115](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f115) As in the case of the global economy, U.S. security provision [End Page 47] plays a role in fostering stability within and across regions, and this has an impact on the ability of states to engage in institutional cooperation. Institutional cooperation is least likely in areas of the world where instability is pervasive. It is more likely to flourish in areas where states are secure and leaders can anticipate stable and continuous relations—where the "shadow of the future" is most evident. And because of the key security role it plays in fostering this institutional cooperation, the United States is in a stronger position to help shape the contours of these cooperative efforts.¶ The United States' extended system of security commitments creates a set of institutional relationships that foster political communication. Alliance institutions are in the first instance about security protection, but they are also mechanisms that provide a kind of "political architecture" that is useful beyond narrow issues of military affairs. Alliances bind states together and create institutional channels of communication. NATO has facilitated ties and associated institutions—such as the Atlantic Council—that increase the ability of the United States and Europe to talk to each other and do business.116 Likewise, the bilateral alliances in East Asia also play a communication role beyond narrow security issues. Consultations and exchanges spill over into other policy areas.[117](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f117) For example, when U.S. officials travel to Seoul to consult on alliance issues, they also routinely talk about other pending issues, such as, recently, the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This gives the United States the capacity to work across issue areas, using assets and bargaining chips in one area to make progress in another. It also provides more diffuse political benefits to cooperation that flow from the "voice opportunities" created by the security alliance architecture.118 The alliances provide channels and access points for wider flows of communication—and [End Page 48] the benefits of greater political solidarity and institutional cooperation that follow.¶ The benefits of these communication flows cut across all international issues, but are arguably enhanced with respect to generating security cooperation to deal with new kinds of threats—such as terrorism and health pandemics—that require a multitude of novel bargains and newly established procedures of shared responsibilities among a wide range of countries. With the existing U.S.-led security system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it otherwise would be to strike bargains and share burdens of security cooperation in such areas. The challenge of rising security interdependence is greater security cooperation. That is, when countries are increasingly mutually vulnerable to nontraditional, diffuse, transnational threats, they need to work together to eradicate the conditions that allow for these threats and limit the damage. The U.S.-led alliance system is a platform with already existing capacities and routines for security cooperation. These assets can be used or adapted, saving the cost of generating security cooperation from scratch. In short, having an institution in place to facilitate cooperation on one issue makes it easier, and more likely, that the participating states will be able to achieve cooperation rapidly on a related issue.[119](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v037/37.3.brooks.html#f119)¶ The usefulness of the U.S. alliance system for generating enhanced non-security cooperation is confirmed in interviews with former State Department and National Security Council officials. One former administration official noted, using the examples of Australia and South Korea, that the security ties "create nonsecurity benefits in terms of support for global agenda issues," such as Afghanistan, Copenhagen, disaster relief, and the financial crisis. "This is not security leverage per se, but it is an indication of how the deepness of the security relationship creates working relationships [and] interoperability that can then be leveraged to address other regional issues." This official notes, "We could not have organized the Core Group (India, U.S., Australia, Japan) in [End Page 49] response to the 2004 tsunami without the deep bilateral military relationships that had already been in place. It was much easier for us to organize with these countries almost immediately (within forty-eight hours) than anyone else for a large-scale humanitarian operation because our militaries were accustomed to each other."120¶ The United States' role as security provider also has a more direct effect of enhancing its authority and capacity to initiate institutional cooperation in various policy areas. The fact that the United States is a security patron of Japan, South Korea, and other countries in East Asia, for example, gives it a weight and presence in regional diplomacy over the shape and scope of multilateral cooperation not just within the region but also elsewhere. This does not mean that the United States always wins these diplomatic encounters, but its leverage is greater than it would be if the United States were purely an offshore great power without institutionalized security ties to the region.¶ In sum, the deep engagement strategy enables U.S. leadership, which results in more cooperation on matters of importance than would occur if the United States disengaged—even as it pushes cooperation toward U.S. preferences.

#### Multilateralism is a credible alternative- it promotes band-wagoning and international coalitions among US allies, strengthening the US-led system and reviving legitimacy

\*only multilateralism solves global problems, unilateralism fails for several reasons –

a. technology – the internet and instant communications makes small states and non-state actors immune to hard power – even rogue states can shape public opinion against America through state-run news agencies

b. threats – terrorism, disease and the private arms trade cannot be addressed via unilateralism – they are global problems that demand local solutions which only multilateralism resolves

c. facilitates state-sponsored backlash – creates bloated international institutions that delay successful solutions – the failures of Kyoto, Copenhagen and every global trade treaty for the past 20 years prove that hard power doesn’t result in global cooperation – multilateralism results in joint-info sharing that solves

**Ikenberry and Kupchan 04 –** (John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, “Liberal Realism: The Foundations of a Democratic Foreign Policy,” National Interest (Fall 2004))

It is misguided, however, to assume that America's preponderant power, when combined with an assertive unilateralism, promotes stability as a matter of course. As the record of the past four years makes clear, the unfettered exercise of U.S. primacy has not led to deference and bandwagoning, but to resentment and incipient balancing. The problem is not unipolarity per se, but changes in the exercise of U.S. power that have in turn changed foreign perceptions of U.S. intentions and how the United States will use its preponderant strength. A dominant America that reassures others and deploys its power to secure public goods induces systemic stability; unfettered primacy deployed in the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest does the opposite.

The Bush Administration's grand strategy rests on a second geopolitical misconception: that U.S. primacy is durable. To be sure, America's economic and military might ensures that it will remain the world's leading nation for decades to come. But current power asymmetries will inevitably diminish in the years ahead. The European Union's wealth already rivals that of the United States, and it may well forge a more independent and unified security policy as this decade proceeds. Over the course of the next decade, Japan may tire of always following America's lead, China will emerge as a major power, and Russia, India and Brazil are poised to become stronger and more assertive players. It will be impossible for the United States to sustain current power, asymmetries. Indeed, if America seeks to preserve unipolarity and its attendant sway over global affairs, it will only ensure that other centers of power, as they rise, array their strength against the United States.

Finally, the Bush Administration has overestimated the advantages of military superiority and mistaken brute strength for influence, producing adverse consequences on a number of fronts. In Iraq, Washington was correct that Saddam Hussein's regime would crumble under the U.S. onslaught, but it failed to appreciate that the invasion would spawn a dangerous mix of nationalism and religious extremism, leaving the United States struggling against a guerrilla insurgency that effectively neutralized America's military might. In similar fashion, the Bush Administration is aware that its unilateralist bent has provoked **anti-American sentiment** in many quarters, but it has discounted the discontent because countries opposed to U.S. policy do not have the military wherewithal to stand in America's way.

Although it is correct that other countries are not forming alliances against the United States, Washington is overlooking the more subtle forms of balancing that are occurring--with potent geopolitical consequence. The broad coalition that blocked UN authorization of the Iraq War denied the United States the legitimacy of international approval, substantially raising the economic and political costs of the war. Allies bore **90 percent of the costs** of the Gulf War, but the American taxpayer has financed most of the current operation, and Washington has been unable to convince key allies to send troops to Iraq. If the United States continues on its current course, it will enjoy military supremacy, but little else.

FROM THE perspective of liberal realism, management of the global balance of power would be based on three propositions. First, the United States must wield its superior strength in concert with others to ensure that it forestalls rather than invites balancing behavior. Re-establishing America's bona tides as a benign hegemon necessitates resuscitating the alliances, institutions and consultations that have eroded under Bush's watch. The United States should of course reserve the fight to act alone as a last resort, hut Washington must rediscover that the costs of unilateral action usually far exceed the costs of seeking consensus.

Second, liberal realism entails moving with--rather than against--the secular diffusion of global power. The scope of American primacy will wane as this century progresses; the ultimate objective should be to channel rising centers of strength into cooperative partnerships with the United States. Furthermore, strength elsewhere, even if it comes at the expense of America's relative power, need not come at the expense of its influence and security. If rising centers of power are integrated into a rule-based order, they promise to be net contributors to international stability. Americans would benefit substantially from a Europe that is capable of projecting power outside its neighborhood and sharing risks and responsibilities with the United States. China is emerging as one of Asia's dominant states; what is in question is not whether its power will rise, but the ends to which it will use its growing strength.

Third, liberal realism rests on a multidimensional understanding of power, sensitive to the fact that America's military supremacy, although a vital element of national strength, is not sufficient to safeguard American security. The United States should continue to invest in its armed forces and maintain its pronounced military advantage, but absent respect for U.S. leadership abroad, U.S. primacy does more to divide the world than to unite it. Washington needs to renew the non-military dimensions of its global influence, working to reclaim its moral authority abroad and to make disaffected allies again feel like stakeholders in the international system.

#### Specifically, it solves inevitable Asian transition wars which go nuclear

\*great power war goes nuclear, mutually assured destruction can’t check – best power transition experts conclude based off decades of demographic and economic research that inevitable transition wars from collapse of unilateralism causes retrenchment wars spurring lash-out drawing in China and India – only multilateralism solves by persuading Chinese leaders to maintain the status quo

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Given the fundamental importance of demographic and economic forces in establishing the roster of states capable of fundamentally affecting the structure of world politics, whatever resolution there might be to the Global War on Terror will not alter the major challenge faced by the United States. In the long run, China’s demographic and hence economic power cannot be denied. By the same reasoning, the Middle East has no long-run demographic or economic power. The U.S. courts long-term peril by being obsessively distracted by short-term objectives. To ensure real peace, the U.S. would be much better advised to preserve strong links with the EU, maintain and improve cordial relations with Russia, and most importantly, open a sincere dialogue with India and China designed to maximize their support for the existing status quo. To be sure, positive, but limited, steps have been taken by the United States. American support for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization was important because it helps integrate China’s growing economy more fully into the capitalist world economy. Similar recognition for India, not to mention support for Indian membership on the United Nations Security Council, would also be beneﬁcial. Because Taiwan and Korea have replaced the Cold War’s Berlin as focal points for potential Great Power conﬂict, ﬁnding an accommodation that meets the desires of the main parties with respect to them is central to the preservation of long-term peace. The economic, demographic, and political science research summarized above suggests that American foreign policy attention must center on China and India as the major future contenders for global leadership. Although China retains a political ideology inconsistent with democracy, there are good reasons to expect and thus to work toward change to a participatory system based on increasing prosperity (Feng 2003; Feng and Zak 2003). India is the largest democracy in the world, but like China it is still not a major partner of the Western world. While these relationships may develop and prosper on their own, the relative amount of attention paid to these rising giants compared with the Global War on Terror is simply insupportable. Neither convergence arguments nor power transition theory suggests that future Great Power war between Asia and the West is inevitable. The research described here offers evidence about probabilistic relationships between parity and status quo evaluations on the one hand, and war on the other. Thus, while China’s overtaking of the U.S. may be relatively certain, the result of that overtaking is not. Power transition research supports claims that overtakings are dangerous when policy makers fail to accommodate them. A conﬂict between China or India and the United States as the Asian giants emerge from the shadows of underdevelopment is **not inevitable**. Rather, the political negotiations among contenders determine whether potential challengers can be made satisﬁed with the rules and norms governing world politics. If the declining dominant state is able to engineer a satisfactory compromise between the demands of the rising state and its own requirements (as Britain and the U.S. did when peacefully passing the mantle of international leadership), war is not expected. If the two sides remain intransigent, **war is expected**. It is clear that such a war in the twenty-ﬁrst century would have a **very high probability** of involving **nuclear weapons**. A clear counterexpectation can be drawn from classical nuclear deterrence arguments. They involve a fundamental assumption that as the costs of war increase, the probability of war decreases. Nuclear weapons are then alleged to alter calculations substantially because they raise the expected costs of war so high that war becomes unthinkable. According to this logic, a global war between a newly predominant China and a declining U.S. will never occur thanks to the pacifying inﬂuence of the balance of terror. A new Cold War is anticipated by this nuclear deterrence argument. Consistent with this theory, various scholars have advocated the proliferation of nuclear weapons as one method to prevent wars (Intriligator and Brito 1981; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982). An odd paradox is raised by the fact that many world leaders accept nuclear deterrence claims, such as that about the stability of mutual assured destruction (MAD), while rejecting the logical concomitant that proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and more states is desirable. What follows logically has stubbornly resisted practical implementation. Thus, using some other logic, leaders of nuclear nations seem to agree that deterrence is stable under MAD but nevertheless also agree that nuclear proliferation must be prevented in order to preserve peace. If decision makers really believed MAD is stable, it is impossible to understand why they would oppose nuclear proliferation to Iran, thereby creating stable nuclear parity in the Middle East. This inconsistency was noted years ago by Rosen (1977), but subsequently conveniently overlooked. Theory and policy may frequently be at odds, but seldom when the costs of such logical inconsistency are so high. Power transition theorists are inherently suspicious of MAD arguments about nuclear stability because they essentially resurrect traditional balance of power arguments. Rather than focusing on conventional balance as a pacifying inﬂuence, nuclear deterrence proponents of MAD suggest that a nuclear balance will maintain the peace. Given a fortuitous absence of wars among nuclear states thus far, it is impossible to test arguments such as that about MAD. But what we can observe is not promising. It is not only policy makers who doubt the veracity of MAD when they deny the logical consequence of ‘‘beneﬁcial’’ proliferation. Recent formal presentations of deterrence arguments strongly suggest that a preponderance of nuclear capabilities specifically in the possession of satisﬁed states is more amenable to peace than is MAD (Zagare and Kilgour 2000). Power transition theorists, informed by their own as well as by **decades** of demographic and economic research, strongly doubt that nuclear parity between the U.S. and a risen but dissatisﬁed China could preserve the peace. Conclusions It is entirely reasonable to anticipate that Asia will dominate world politics by the end of the century. The most important issue facing American decision makers is how to handle the anticipated overtaking. The research summarized here indicates that the one element of Asia’s ascent that Western decision makers can manipulate is Asia’s relative acceptance of the international system’s existing norms and values. War is not an inevitable certainty. The opportunity for peace is at hand. If Western decision makers can persuade Chinese and Indian leaders through word and deed to join with the current global status quo, peace and prosperity should endure. If, on the other hand, China and India cannot be persuaded to join the existing structure of relations, then the chances for conﬂict increase around mid-century. The research summarized here suggests this is true even in the face of the enormous costs that reasonably would be anticipated from a nuclear war.

#### The plan solves–

#### First, repeal would represent a commitment to multilateralism for the international community, and also bolster human rights credibility that motivates other countries to rally behind the United States

\*plan spreads multilateralism – only the removal of the embargo carries the symbolic weight of revoking previous unilateral efforts to backlash against other countries in votes during conferences in the UN

\*overwhelms alternative causes – removing the embargo signifies an endorsement of international law that overwhelms human rights violations in Guantanamo and Iraq – prefer comparative evidence

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In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2 If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral forums in general on human rights matters, Washington, as a matter of priority, needs to restore US credibility, thus making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders. Outlook: Will President Obama radically change US policy towards Cuba? An answer to that question requires reviewing three important factors: first, constraints and opportunities in the political environment in the US, i.e. power constellations in the Congress and in Florida; second, interests in Cuba, i.e. Cuba’s elite and the domestic opposition; and third, likely reactions in the international community, i.e. within the Latin American and Caribbean region; in Europe; with respect to Cuba’s allies; and last but not least, at multilateral level. 6.1 What are the key considerations in today’s political environment in the US? During the electoral campaign Obama promised to undo the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed by the first Bush administration. He called the embargo a “complete fiasco” but shied away from suggesting the lifting of the economic sanctions or revoking Helms-Burton, saying that he would maintain the embargo as long as no substantial political reform and release of political prisoners would take place on the island. In essence, Obama’s proposed measures would correspond to a policy similar to the one enacted during the second term of President Clinton. This was during the campaign. Is it reasonable to assume that Obama’s resounding victory nation-wide and in Florida provide a more conducive domestic platform for overhauling for good the failed and discredited embargo policy? Most observers would give a negative answer, at least during President Obama’s first two years in office, and this for the following reasons: First, Cuba and Latin America are not among the top foreign policy concerns at this juncture. Second, while US business is clearly interested in strengthening trade and developing investment ties with Cuba strong pressure, so far, has only come from the agribusiness sector which succeeded in exporting US goods despite the embargo since 2002. Moreover, Cuban demand is still crippled by rather modest purchasing power and the overall business and regulatory environment is certainly not conducive to foreign investment. Third, despite a change in the electoral map overall and a slow generational change within the Cuban-American community, a clear majority of registered Cuban-American voters actually participating in elections leans towards the Republican party and can still be mobilized around the single issue of taking a principled stance against the Castro regime (e.g. all three Republican incumbents in Miami Dade county have re-won their seats; moreover, in 2010 Senator Mel Martinez’ seat comes up for election – if the Democrats were to take his seat they could come close to gaining a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate). Few commentators, on the other hand, think that the new president should and could lift the embargo during his first year in office, arguing that he enjoys at present and for a limited period only, a unique window of opportunity because of the high rate of approval at home and abroad (including in Cuba among the Afro-Cuban community). Lifting the embargo unconditionally would be widely heralded as the dawning of a new era in the Western Hemisphere and beyond, with immediate positive repercussions on bilateral relations with all major Latin American and Caribbean countries. Pressure to lift the embargo, or parts of it, may also come from the powerful US oil lobby if commercially viable finds are discovered in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone, with Cuba actively courting US investments in the remaining off-shore blocks. It would make little sense for the US to prohibit off-shore oil exploration in Florida’s continental shelf when a few miles further down South numerous international companies exploit Cuba’s oil and gas reserves. Moreover, the argument goes, President Obama does not need to ‘pander’ to the conservative Cuban-American vote in South Florida (i.e. those 65% having voted for McCain) because this part of the electorate will remain an anti-Obama constituency no matter what he does. As a matter of fact, the democrats could actually loose Latino votes in Florida in the next elections among the nonCuban Latino community and among those 35% of Cuban-Americans having supported Obama in 2008 (according to exit polls 75% of whom are reported to be against the embargo) if his Cuba policy changes remain largely symbolic, i.e. simply undoing what has been established under President Bush, while maintaining the embargo. As far as the 2010 Florida senate seat is concerned seasoned political analysts recall that, traditionally, any incumbent president’s party tends to loose seats in mid-term elections, thus making the prospect of getting closer to the 60 seat majority a rather difficult task (especially if former governor Jeb Bush were to run for the vacant post). 6.2 How about the political environment in Cuba? Since coming to power in August 2006 Raul Castro has reiterated on several occasions that Cuba is willing to discuss with the US ways and means to improve bilateral relations and bring an end to the policy of confrontation. The only requisite would be to conduct these talks on the basis of equality and without any political pre-conditions. These statements did not contain much of a political risk for Havana since they were unlikely to be heeded by the Bush administration. If, however, the Obama administration were to take them at face value, it is fair to say that Cuba’s government appears to be ill-prepared for commencing meaningful discussions with the US. For the past 50 years the official dogma was based on the premise that US policy is hostile, interventionist and imperialist. A fundamental overhaul of the US approach towards Havana would make it difficult for the Cuban government to continue propagating the David-versus-Goliath myth, considering that the new US president, as an Afro-American, shares with two-thirds of Cubans a similar ethnic background. Obama may indeed be perceived by many in Cuba as the personification of a different, less fearful and certainly better America. In this context it is interesting to note that Armando Hart, former Minister of Culture and one of the chief ideologues of the Communist party, published an article in Granma in October 2008 where he underlined the need for defending the Cuban Revolution against the erosive power of a non-embargo centered, i.e. open door US policy towards Cuba. Havana might, indeed, not be ready yet to engage with Washington under a non-embargo scenario. The present situation, with the embargo being nominally in place (yet discredited internationally and in Cuba, in addition to being undermined in its impact because of direct commercial links with US business and the massive flow of remittances without the ‘danger’ of millions of visiting Americans pouring into the island), seems to be the best of both worlds for Cuba: while Havana can blame US hostility for domestic development problems, which serves the regime well politically both abroad and at home, the embargo does not do any major economic and financial damage that would jeopardize the survival of the regime. Furthermore, Cuba’s illegal political opposition strongly disagrees with the embargo because the continuation of a coercive policy framework is used by the authorities as a pretext to discredit those opposing the regime as ‘puppets’ and ‘counterrevolutionary agents’ at the service of the US. The Cuban opposition would clearly prefer Washington to conduct an open door policy addressing all sectors of the Cuban society, including, of course, concrete measures supporting directly the emerging dissident movement and providing high-profile visibility to human rights defenders. 6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

#### That bolsters legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, which locks in institutional norms to bring rising powers into the system safely

Fujimoto 12 (Kevin Fujimoto 12, Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, January 11, 2012, “Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct,” online: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Preserving-US-National-Security-Interests-Liberal-World-Construct/2012/1/11>)

The emergence of peer competitors, not terrorism, presents the greatest long-term threat to our national security. Over the past decade, while the United States concentrated its geopolitical focus on fighting two land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has quietly begun implementing a strategy to emerge as the dominant imperial power within Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Within the next 2 decades, China will likely replace the United States as the Asia-Pacific regional hegemonic power, if not replace us as the global superpower.1 Although China presents its rise as peaceful and non-hegemonic, its construction of naval bases in neighboring countries and military expansion in the region contradict that argument. With a credible threat to its leading position in a unipolar global order, the United States should adopt a grand strategy of “investment,” building legitimacy and capacity in the very institutions that will protect our interests in a liberal global construct of the future when we are no longer the dominant imperial power. Similar to the Clinton era's grand strategy of “enlargement,”2 investment supports a world order predicated upon a system of basic rules and principles, however, it differs in that the United States should concentrate on the institutions (i.e., United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, alliances, etc.) that support a world order, as opposed to expanding democracy as a system of governance for other sovereign nations. Despite its claims of a benevolent expansion, China is already executing a strategy of expansion similar to that of Imperial Japan's Manchukuo policy during the 1930s.3 This three-part strategy involves: “(i) (providing) significant investments in economic infrastructure for extracting natural resources; (ii) (conducting) military interventions (to) protect economic interests; and, (iii) . . . (annexing) via installation of puppet governments.”4 China has already solidified its control over neighboring North Korea and Burma, and has similarly begun more ambitious engagements in Africa and Central Asia where it seeks to expand its frontier.5 Noted political scientist Samuel P. Huntington provides further analysis of the motives behind China's imperial aspirations. He contends that “China (has) historically conceived itself as encompassing a “‘Sinic Zone'. . . (with) two goals: to become the champion of Chinese culture . . . and to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.”6 Furthermore, China holds one quarter of the world's population, and rapid economic growth will increase its demand for natural resources from outside its borders as its people seek a standard of living comparable to that of Western civilization. The rise of peer competitors has historically resulted in regional instability and one should compare “the emergence of China to the rise of. . . Germany as the dominant power in Europe in the late nineteenth century.”7 Furthermore, the rise of another peer competitor on the level of the Soviet Union of the Cold War ultimately threatens U.S. global influence, challenging its concepts of human rights, liberalism, and democracy; as well as its ability to co-opt other nations to accept them.8 This decline in influence, while initially limited to the Asia-Pacific region, threatens to result in significant conflict if it ultimately leads to a paradigm shift in the ideas and principles that govern the existing world order. A grand strategy of investment to address the threat of China requires investing in institutions, addressing ungoverned states, and building legitimacy through multilateralism. The United States must build capacity in the existing institutions and alliances accepted globally as legitimate representative bodies of the world's governments. For true legitimacy, the United States must support these institutions, not only when convenient, in order to avoid the appearance of unilateralism, which would ultimately undermine the very organizations upon whom it will rely when it is no longer the global hegemon. The United States must also address ungoverned states, not only as breeding grounds for terrorism, but as conflicts that threaten to spread into regional instability, thereby drawing in superpowers with competing interests. Huntington proposes that the greatest source of conflict will come from what he defines as one “core” nation's involvement in a conflict between another core nation and a minor state within its immediate sphere of influence.9 For example, regional instability in South Asia10 threatens to involve combatants from the United States, India, China, and the surrounding nations. Appropriately, the United States, as a global power, must apply all elements of its national power now to address the problem of weak and failing states, which threaten to serve as the principal catalysts of future global conflicts.11 Admittedly, the application of American power in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation raises issues. Experts have posed the question of whether the United States should act as the world's enforcer of stability, imposing its concepts of human rights on other states. In response to this concern, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty authored a study titled, The Responsibility to Protect,12 calling for revisions to the understanding of sovereignty within the United Nations (UN) charter. This commission places the responsibility to protect peoples of sovereign nations on both the state itself and, more importantly, on the international community.13 If approved, this revision will establish a precedent whereby the United States has not only the authority and responsibility to act within the internal affairs of a repressive government, but does so with global legitimacy if done under the auspices of a UN mandate. Any effort to legitimize and support a liberal world construct requires the United States to adopt a multilateral doctrine whichavoidsthe precepts of the previous administration: “preemptive war, democratization, and U.S. primacy of unilateralism,”14 which have resulted in the alienation of former allies worldwide. Predominantly Muslim nations, whose citizens had previously looked to the United States as an example of representative governance, viewed the Iraq invasion as the seminal dividing action between the Western and the Islamic world. Appropriately, any future American interventions into the internal affairs of another sovereign nation must first seek to establish consensus by gaining the approval of a body representing global opinion, and must reject military unilateralism as a threat to that governing body's legitimacy. Despite the long-standing U.S. tradition of a liberal foreign policy since the start of the Cold War, the famous liberal leviathan, John Ikenberry, argues that “the post-9/11 doctrine of national security strategy . . . has been based on . . . American global dominance, the preventative use of force, coalitions of the willing, and the struggle between liberty and evil.”15 American foreign policy has misguidedly focused on spreading democracy, as opposed to building a liberal international order based on universally accepted principles that actually set the conditions for individual nation states to select their own system of governance. Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, argues that true Wilsonian idealists “support liberal democracy, but reject the possibility of democratizing peoples . . .”16 and reject military primacy in favor of supporting a rules-based system of order. Investment in a liberal world order would also set the conditions for the United States to garner support from noncommitted regional powers (i.e., Russia, India, Japan, etc.), or “swing civilizations,” in countering China's increasing hegemonic influence.17 These states reside within close proximity to the Indian Ocean, which will likely emerge as the geopolitical focus of the American foreign policy during the 21st century, and appropriately have the ability to offset China's imperial dominance in the region.18 Critics of a liberal world construct argue that idealism is not necessary, based on the assumption that nations that trade together will not go to war with each other.19 In response, foreign affairs columnist Thomas L. Friedman rebukes their arguments, acknowledging the predicate of commercial interdependence as a factor only in the decision to go to war, and argues that while globalization is creating a new international order, differences between civilizations still create friction that may overcome all other factors and lead to conflict.20 Detractors also warn that as China grows in power, it will no longer observe “the basic rules and principles of a liberal international order,” which largely result from Western concepts of foreign relations. Ikenberry addresses this risk, citing that China's leaders already recognize that they will gain more authority within the existing liberal order, as opposed to contesting it. China's leaders “want the protection and rights that come from the international order's . . . defense of sovereignty,”21 from which they have benefitted during their recent history of economic growth and international expansion. Even if China executes a peaceful rise and the United States overestimates a Sinic threat to its national security interest, the emergence of a new imperial power will challenge American leadership in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region. That being said, it is more likely that China, as evidenced by its military and economic expansion, will displace the United States as the regional hegemonic power. Recognizing this threat now, the United States must prepare for the eventual transition and immediately begin building the legitimacy and support of a system of rules that will protect its interests later when we are no longer the world's only superpower.

#### Second, the plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model which prevents conflict – status quo policies risk disengagement

\*plan fosters a credible conflict resolution model – increases diplomatic negotiations with Cuba which even if they fail garner international support for America in multilateral negotiations – also increase Cuban relations which spreads democratic efforts worldwide giving the US a hedge in multilateral institutions

\*solves Kashmir conflict – plan fosters international momentum and credibility to leverage international dialogue in resolving human rights abuses, military buildup and Indo-Pakistan tensions in the region – solves the root cause of the problem

\*solves Middle East conflict – increased credibility allows Obama to leverage his international reputation with rogue nations like Iran to control fissile material and international leverage allows us to de-escalate Middle East tensions

**Dickerson 10** – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>) // NG

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a **powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba**. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.

While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.

On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. **If negotiations break down** and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, **international support would be easier to garner**.

Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy.

Policy and National Interest

Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.

From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7

The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.

As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.

The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15

By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.

The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.

A History of Anger and Distrust

After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.

Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.

The embargo itself remains a **perpetual albatross** that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20

Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26

Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries.

It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro.

Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and **economic engagement** in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations.

As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.

Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement.

The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.

How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.

Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.

In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool.

Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?

Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.

While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.

Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis

If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.

The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate.

Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these.

We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.

If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections.

The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.

While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.

Conclusion

Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.

If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could **afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir**. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

#### That conflict model bolsters Obama’s credibility and convinces other countries to negotiate with the United States

Hinderdael, 11– M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center (Klaas, “Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership”, <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>)//NG

Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Third, the plan sends a clear signal of cooperation to Latin America, creating new partnerships and bolstering relations

\*plan sends a signal of Latin American cooperation to reinvigorate the OAS – even though Cuba’s suspension was revoked in 2009, there exists a disconnect between their reenlistment and the continuation of the embargo – corrupts the OAS agenda by delegitimizing US credibility

\*solves Latin American relations – choice statements from leaders of the Bolivarian Alliance prove Cuba is the nexus point of increased relations which solves multilateralism by enlisting support of developing countries who bandwagon with Latin America

**White 13** – Senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and former U.S. ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador (Robert, “After Chávez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba”, New York Times, 3/7/13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all)//TL>

FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America.

Yet for a half-century, our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela — who along with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades — offers an opportunity to restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of prosperity.

Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chávez used our embargo as a wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Raúl, Cuba’s current president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all); President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress.

An **end to the Cuba embargo would send a powerful signal to all of Latin America** that the United States wants a new, warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change throughout the Americas.

I joined the State Department as a Foreign Service officer in the 1950s and chose to serve in Latin America in the 1960s. I was inspired by President John F. Kennedy’s creative response to the revolutionary fervor then sweeping Latin America. The 1959 Cuban revolution, led by the charismatic Fidel Castro, had inspired revolts against the cruel dictatorships and corrupt pseudodemocracies that had dominated the region since the end of Spanish and Portuguese rule in the 19th century.

Kennedy had a charisma of his own, and it captured the imaginations of leaders who wanted democratic change, not violent revolution. Kennedy reacted to the threat of continental insurrection by creating the Alliance for Progress, a kind of Marshall Plan for the hemisphere that was calculated to achieve the same kind of results that saved Western Europe from Communism. He pledged billions of dollars to this effort. In hindsight, it may have been overly ambitious, even naïve, but Kennedy’s focus on Latin America rekindled the promise of the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and transformed the whole concept of inter-American relations.

Tragically, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the ideal of the Alliance for Progress crumbled and “la noche mas larga” — “the longest night” — began for the proponents of Latin American democracy. Military regimes flourished, democratic governments withered, moderate political and civil leaders were labeled Communists, rights of free speech and assembly were curtailed and human dignity crushed, largely because the United States abandoned all standards save that of anti-Communism.

During my Foreign Service career, I did what I could to oppose policies that supported dictators and closed off democratic alternatives. In 1981, as the ambassador to El Salvador, I refused a demand by the secretary of state, Alexander M. Haig Jr., that I use official channels to cover up the Salvadoran military’s responsibility for the murders of four American churchwomen. I was fired and forced out of the Foreign Service.

The Reagan administration, under the illusion that Cuba was the power driving the Salvadoran revolution, turned its policy over to the Pentagon and C.I.A., with predictable results. During the 1980s the United States helped expand the Salvadoran military, which was dominated by uniformed assassins. We armed them, trained them and covered up their crimes.

After our counterrevolutionary efforts failed to end the Salvadoran conflict, the Defense Department asked its research institute, the RAND Corporation, what had gone wrong. RAND analysts found that United States policy makers had refused to accept the obvious truth that the insurgents were rebelling against social injustice and state terror. As a result, “we pursued a policy unsettling to ourselves, for ends humiliating to the Salvadorans and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional conception of the national interest.”

Over the subsequent quarter-century, a series of profound political, social and economic changes have undermined the traditional power bases in Latin America and, with them, longstanding regional institutions like the Organization of American States. The organization, which is headquartered in Washington and which excluded Cuba in 1962, was seen as irrelevant by Mr. Chávez. He promoted the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States — which excludes the United States and Canada — as an alternative.

At a regional meeting that included Cuba and excluded the United States, Mr. Chávez said that “the most positive thing for the independence of our continent is that we meet alone without the hegemony of empire.”

Mr. Chávez was masterful at manipulating America’s antagonism toward Fidel Castro as a rhetorical stick with which to attack the United States as an imperialist aggressor, an enemy of progressive change, interested mainly in treating Latin America as a vassal continent, a source of cheap commodities and labor.

Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.

Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.

After the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington set out to accomplish by stealth and economic strangulation what it had failed to do by frontal attack. But the clumsy mix of covert action and porous boycott succeeded primarily in bringing shame on the United States and turning Mr. Castro into a folk hero.

And even now, despite the relaxing of travel restrictions and Raúl Castro’s announcement that he will retire in 2018, the implacable hatred of many within the Cuban exile community continues. The fact that two of the three Cuban-American members of the Senate — Marco Rubio of Florida and Ted Cruz of Texas — are rising stars in the Republican Party complicates further the potential for a recalibration of Cuban-American relations. (The third member, Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, is the new chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but his power has been weakened by a continuing ethics controversy.)

Are there any other examples in the history of diplomacy where the leaders of a small, weak nation can prevent a great power from acting in its own best interest merely by staying alive?

The re-election of President Obama, and the death of Mr. Chávez, give America a chance to reassess the irrational hold on our imaginations that Fidel Castro has exerted for five decades. The president and his new secretary of state, John Kerry, should quietly reach out to Latin American leaders like President Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia and José Miguel Insulza, secretary general of the Organization of American States. The message should be simple: The president is prepared to show some flexibility on Cuba and asks your help.

Such a simple request could transform the Cuban issue from a bilateral problem into a multilateral challenge. It would then be up to Latin Americans to devise a policy that would help Cuba achieve a sufficient measure of democratic change to justify its reintegration into a hemisphere composed entirely of elected governments.

If, however, our present policy paralysis continues, we will soon see the emergence of two rival camps, the United States versus Latin America. While Washington would continue to enjoy friendly relations with individual countries like Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, the vision of Roosevelt and Kennedy of a hemisphere of partners cooperating in matters of common concern would be reduced to a historical footnote.

#### Increased regional standing bolsters influence in international institutions through the creation of voting blocs, allowing the US to lead multilateral forums

\*plan boosts influence in international institutions – re-integrates Latin American as a regional ally to counterbalance emerging economic powers and improves US diplomacy with their support

\*the internal link is perception based – the perception of America lacking regional allies encourages increasing economic powers to diametrically oppose the US in multilateral institutions to crush our agenda

**Sabatini and Berger 12 –** Christopher Sabatini is editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas. Ryan Berger is a policy associate at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas(Christopher/Ryan, "Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America" 6/13/12, CNN/Global Public Square, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/)//AD>

Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called Latin America “a region on the move,” one that is “more important to the prosperity and security of the United States than ever before.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies. Recently, countries with emerging economies have appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” At a time of (**perceived**) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with **regional allies** that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations such as Brazil clamor for permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council and more representatives in the higher reaches of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them. If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda. Worse, they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights. 2. Latin America is becoming more international. It’s time to understand that the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America. For far too long, U.S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate, politically and strategically, from the rest of the world. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region. It’s also clear that countries such as Brazil and Venezuela present their own challenges to U.S. influence in the region and even on the world forum. The U.S. must embed its Latin America relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba. 3. There are security and strategic risks in the region. Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the Venezuelan state and alleged ties between FARC rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border. FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government. At the same time, gangs, narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north. Given their proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington, the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states. There are many other reasons why Latin America is important to U.S. interests. It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking points since the early 1990s. But the demands of the globe today are different, and they warrant a renewed engagement with Latin America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere. We need to stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.

#### That leads to greater power sharing and international cooperation, resolving conflict

\*multilateralism solves global problems –

a. fosters great power sharing – increased multilateral dialogue devises similar analytics lenses that make policies more readily adopted on a large scale

b. increases international cooperation – lends legitimacy to policies by virtue of debate and increases efficient implementation of joint programs because actors feel invested in solutions – creates a self-reinforcing dynamic which creates new focal points for strategic interaction

**Pouliot 11** — Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)//NG

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the **drive to cooperate**. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of **common frameworks** for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global **cooperation, and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of **moderation** in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to **avoid radical solutions** in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share **similar analytical lenses** that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends **legitimacy** to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more **efficient implementation**, because actors feel **invested** in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates **self-reinforcing dynamics** and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

### 1ac – solvency

**CONTENTION 3 IS SOLVENCY**

#### Normal Trade Relations is vital – no trade occurs without it

\*normal trade relations are critical – even if the US were to lift the entire embargo, that doesn’t initiate trade because actual trade depends on the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners – otherwise sustainable trade is impossible

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the path to “normal” trade relations

If the United States were to lift its trade embargo against Cuba, this would not automatically confer “normal” status to the bilateral trade relationship. It would mean that the United States and Cuba have the opportunity to begin trading in more goods and services than they have in the last fifty years. Whether much expanded trade **actually occurs** depends on whether the United States were to take additional steps beyond lifting the embargo: the most important of which is the provision of Normal Trade Relations (NTR).

NTR is a technical term which refers to the provision of nondiscriminatory treatment toward trading partners. Cuba and North Korea are the only two countries to which the United States continues to deny “normal trade relations.” All other countries either have permanent normal trade relations or temporary, renewable normal trade relations with the United States.161

Assuming that the Cuba-specific trade sanctions contained in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (the continuity of which was codified by the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) were to be eliminated, achieving normal trade relations between Cuba and the United States would not be a simple matter. A first stumbling block could be the 1974 Trade Act provision dubbed “Jackson-Vanik,” which prohibits non-market economy countries from receiving normal tariff treatment, entering into a bilateral commercial agreement, or receiving any U.S. government credits or loan guarantees, until the President has reported to Congress that such a country does not: 1) deny its citizens the right to emigrate, 2) impose an unreasonable tax or fine for emigrating, and 3) impose more than a “nominal tax, levy, fine, fee or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice.”162

Thus, Cuba’s restrictions on its citizens’ emigration rights pose an obstacle to normalization of bilateral trade. Only once the requirements set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment have been met, (and absent any other Cuba-specific sanctions, such as the Export Administration Act controls on countries found to be supporting international terrorism), could the United States begin negotiations of a bilateral commercial agreement with Cuba.

To begin to extend normal trade relations to Cuba, the United States would need to enter into a reciprocal trade agreement with Cuba (not equivalent to a “free trade agreement”) that would provide a balance of trade benefits and protections to U.S. exports and commercial entities doing business with Cuba, at the same time it would provide such benefits to Cuba. Such an agreement would need to include protection for U.S. patents and trademarks and for “industrial rights and processes,” include a safeguard mechanism to prevent market disruptions due to trade, and provide that the agreement, and its continuation, be subject to the national security interests of both parties.163 Assuming bilateral relations had reached the appropriate milestones to begin discussing two-way trade, negotiating such an agreement could potentially take years, as both countries would need to adopt statutory and regulatory changes.

#### The unconditional offer of normal trade relations boosts US-Cuban relations and fosters a stable transition

\*unconditional offer of the plan is critical – adding a condition to the offer makes the US seem like a coercive entity that is attempting to forcefully extract concessions from Cuba which exacerbates the imperialist symbol of the embargo

\*plan fosters a stable Cuban democratic transition – normalization of trade relations gives the US the opportunity to provide foreign economic aid to Cuba in the case of Cuban economic decline – allows a stable transition to a democratic state

**Koenig 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>)

The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions unilaterally:

• Lift completely the economic embargo. Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the trading of goods and services between the two countries.

• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of Cubans about their northern neighbor.

• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement. The goal of this initiative would be to achieve **normal trade relations** between the two countries.

This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36 The United States will **gain leverage** with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37

So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative orm of government. The foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” 38 The United States Congress should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base.

Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. “Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.”39 These values include promoting democracy and defending human rights.

The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to **influence** the type of **changes in the Cuban government** as the Castro influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.

There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to **take the initiative away** from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome.

One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat.

Conclusion

The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42

The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

#### Cuban economic reforms are inevitable – however, the AFF safeguards against potential economic disaters through the transition

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Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad.

Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1]

The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for US policy makers. Normalization of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard the process.

The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse consequences for US national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to **unrestricted bilateral trade** with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.

The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area, including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security interests regarding Cuba as follows:

• Avoid one or more mass migrations;

• Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the hemisphere;

• Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade;

• Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and others wishing to harm the United States. [2]

All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.

US policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming private sector – including 300,000 agricultural producers – or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4] Such a policy is counterproductive to US interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5]

A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering the growth of a middle class – both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.

#### The plan changes elite calculus – it removes the fear of regime change and creates buy in for economic and political reform

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Diplomacy, not sanctions, must be the primary tool for resolving differences with Havana and advancing U.S. interests. It is worth remembering that since the 2008 presidential campaign in which President Obama proclaimed the value of negotiating with countries like Cuba, without preconditions, engagement was never defended on the basis of sympathy for the interlocutors but rather, on how best to promote American values and interests. American repudiation of the Castros’ conduct may or may not be well earned, but it should not be an excuse for constraining American influence with Cuban society and elites. Sanctions, if used, should be “smart”, with the objective of influencing Cuban policy (particularly when such policies are under serious debate and transformation), not affecting regime change. While Cuba’s elite do harbor disagreements about how extensive the reform process should be, all factions are united against changes that would render Cuba in any way vulnerable to external efforts at regime change. Different from the model of “Fidel in Command”, the emerging model of bureaucratic politics under Raul is not insulated from elite sensitivities. To the extent that postrevolutionary elites are threatened by U.S. policy (The conditions of the Helms-Burton Act, for instance), they are going to oppose policy changes. To the extent that their interests in a market-oriented reform are advanced by political concessions such as the release of the political prisoners, they will advocate for them. The processes of marketization and political liberalization create an opportunity for the U.S. to initiate actions that could lead to a proliferation of meaningful changes in Cuba. American support for both a democratic and an economically stable Cuba are far from mutually exclusive. As the experience of other countries demonstrates, economic and political reforms are intertwined. Democracy in the long run tends to produce stable governments but the process of getting there is inherently destabilizing. Multiparty elections, for instance, in the absence of a stabilizing economic and social environment tend to be destabilizing and often violent. A growing, market-oriented Cuban economy that enjoys substantial participation from the Cuban Diaspora will be a **major deterrent against violence**. There are numerous examples, world-wide, of the positive repercussions a transition to a market economy (the Cuban non-state sector would jump from 15% of GDP today to 35% in 2015) has for the independence of civil society. The United States should support such a course in Cuba.

#### Lifting the embargo won’t speed reform – instability is more likely without the plan

**Whiting 13 –** (Ashley, LEEHG Institute for Foreign Policy, Policy Recommendation to Lift the Cuban Embargo, 1/30/13,

<http://www.leehg.org/?p=467>)

**The U**nited **S**tates’ **embargo against Cuba has failed** to fulfill its purpose even half a century after its implementation. Although the Cold War ended over twenty years ago, the United States still utilizes this outdated mindset in their relations towards Cuba. The Cuban embargo is one of the last relics of the Cold War era, and it is time to move forward in terms of foreign policy. During a time when containment was the overruling policy of foreign affairs, imposing an embargo against Cuba was rational diplomacy. In today’s times though, using failed and outdated tactics against Cuba will not yield the results that the United States desires. The time has come to reform relations with Cuba. The Cuban embargo should be lifted due to the sanctions’ ineffectiveness, the correlation between wealth and democracy, the benefits of free trade, and the disapproval by the international community. Before entering into the core arguments against the embargo, it is important to understand the history of U.S.-Cuban relations. The embargo was implemented in 1960, during the height of the Cold War, when the Cuban government nationalized U.S. businesses on their land. The Castro regime has still not paid their reparations, and most likely will not do so anytime soon. With the rising communist government, the support from the Soviet Union, and the looming danger of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the embargo was a highly reasonable decision at that time. Although U.S.S.R.-Cuban relations troubled the U.S. fifty years ago, this relationship is no longer an issue. The Helms-Burton act, implemented during the Clinton Administration, strengthened the sanctions but allowed for humanitarian aid. Although critics of the embargo hoped that President Obama would ease these trade restrictions in 2009, the President has openly stated that he shall continue the embargo until Cuba shows signs of democratization. One of the core arguments against the embargo is that the sanctions have failed to spread democracy to Cuba. Although economic sanctions provide an attractive alternative to full-scale military intervention against an antagonistic nation, they often prove to be ineffective. According to research by Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright in their publication, Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers, a sanction will fail if it is unsuccessful at affecting the citizens in a leader’s support coalition. This concept correlates perfectly with the core arguments of the rational political ambition theory. A leader’s support coalition is the percentage of people which a leader must satisfy in order to remain in office. If a leader wants to maintain power, then domestic policies must be focused on satisfying the winning coalition. Considering this hypothesis, dictators will value private goods due to the small size of their winning coalition, whereas democratic leaders will distribute more public goods due to the large size of their winning coalition.[5] Although research shows that sanctions are more effective against other democracies, the United States generally imposes sanctions against authoritarian governments. These sanctions may be used to destabilize a totalitarian state, or to simply demonstrate disapproval. Unintentionally, sanctions against dictatorships generally harm those citizens outside of the electorate. These citizens cannot choose their leaders, but they still face the extreme consequences of their government’s policies. If a sanction fails to negatively alter the support coalition’s loyalty, then the leader shall remain in office. Some studies suggest that imposed sanctions strengthen a dictatorship since the leader must reinforce oppression in response to rising foreign pressure. If this is true, then one could argue that the embargo strengthens the Castro regime more than Cuba’s chances of democratization.[5] Considering the correlation between wealth and democracy, lifting the embargo can serve as a beneficial strategy in democratizing Cuba. Research from Freedom House and GDP measurements have demonstrated a strong correlation between a state’s economic growth and level of democracy. Considering the gruesome fate that generally awaits a dictator after leaving office, it is predictable for totalitarian leaders to avoid implementing democratic reforms. Since the United States cannot force Castro to reform, the U.S. must take a different approach. **By strengthening the Cuban middle class, the U.S. can indirectly push Cuba further down the path of democratization.** One well-known hypothesis, created by political sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, states that, “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain a democracy“.[3] Various examples in history have supported this hypothesis, such as with the prosperity of South Korea. A once autocratic nation, South Korea has flourished after decades of industrialization and urbanization. A strong middle class is the core of a democracy, since economic stability allows for more political participation. Increased economic inequality may not directly decrease democratic stability, but an impoverished population certainty will. If the majority of a population lacks the necessary resources to fulfill their basic needs, then the probability of them participating in politics is quite low. Without such opportunities, these oppressed people can only change their government in the form of a revolution. Even so, revolutions are rare, unpredictable, chaotic, and catastrophic to those directly involved. When considering basic macroeconomic ideas, free trade is theoretically preferable over pure self-reliance. In this age of globalization, the increased rise of economic interdependency must not be ignored. If each country produces that which they have a comparative advantage in, then all states can capitalize on their own prosperity. A tariff on trade generally helps those companies that cannot compete, but such restrictions defeat the purpose of comparative advantage. Even the concept of free trade between international markets injures communism at its core. Lifting the trade embargo shall not only stimulate the United States’ economy, but shall also improve the living conditions of the Cuban population. By opening up the markets in Cuba, the country may slowly move towards capitalist ideals. [4] The Cuban embargo has become increasingly unpopular through the eyes of the public. The international community overwhelmingly condemns the Cuban embargo, with the U.N. General Assembly member states voting 186-2 against the embargo in 2011.[2] Critics of the embargo argue that the United States uses a double standard towards foreign policy with Cuba. The U.S. does not always trade with other capitalist democracies. China is a communist country, and is also one of the United States’ most important trading partners. Saudi Arabia is commonly defined as a dictatorship, yet the U.S. receives oil and other valued resources from this state. In the long run, **Castro’s communism shall eventually crumble.** However, the Cuban embargo has not helped this process of democratization. The embargo has failed at destabilizing the Castro regime, and succeeded in unintentionally harming the civilian population. These sanctions are ineffective since they have failed at directly harming Castro’s support coalition. The lack of a strong middle class decreases Cuba’s chances of democratizing, and enables Castro to continue his oppression. Instead of coercing Castro into making top-down democratic reforms, **the U**nited **S**tates **can stimulate the Cuban economy and encourage reform from the bottom-up.** From a more liberal viewpoint, free trade shall benefit the United States economy since it may allow a new source of income and a wider access of resources. All things considered, the United States should lift this failed embargo and take a new approach in influencing the domestic politics of Cuba.

#### Embargo prevents meaningful econ reform

**CSG 13 –** (Cuba Study Group, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. Policy Toward Cuba February 2013, http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File\_id=45d8f827-174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032)

The primary consequences of Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions have been to isolate the United States from Cuba and to serve as a political scapegoat for the Cuban government’s many failures. It has become a “Great Crutch” to all sides of the Cuba debate. First, for ordinary Cubans, their struggle has fallen hostage to an international dispute between their government and the United States, which they see themselves as powerless to affect. For the Cuban leadership, it has become easier to blame the embargo than to adopt the difficult reforms needed to fix their economy. Lastly, for defenders of the status-quo within the Cuban-American community, it has become easier to wait for the United States to solve our national problem rather than engage in the difficult and necessary processes of reconciliation and reunification. Helms-Burton indiscriminately impacts all sectors of Cuban society, including democracy advocates and private entrepreneurs, causing disproportionate economic damage to the most vulnerable segments of the population. Conditioning our policy of resource denial on sweeping political reforms has only served to strengthen the Cuban government. The scarce resources available in an authoritarian Cuba have been and continue to be allocated primarily based on political priorities, thereby increasing the state’s relative power and its ability to control its citizens. The majority of American voters, Cuban-Americans and Cuban democracy advocates in the Island have rejected isolation as an element of U.S. policy toward Cuba and have called on the U.S. government to implement a policy of greater contact and exchange with Cuban society.ii As Cuba undergoes a slow and uncertain process of reforms, the continued existence of blanket U.S. sanctions only hinders the types of political reforms that Helms-Burton demands. Instead of maintaining a rigid policy that ties our hands and obsesses over hurting the Cuban leadership, U.S. policymakers should adopt a results-oriented policy that focuses primarily on empowering the Cuban people while simultaneously pressing the Cuban government to cease its repressive practices and respect fundamental human www.CubaStudyGroup.org 3 rights. Repealing Helms-Burton would also free civil society development and assistance programs to be implemented outside of a contentious sanctions framework. Furthermore, the Cuba Study Group believes that any forthcoming congressional review of current legislation relating to Cuba, such as a review of the Cuban Adjustment Act, must require a review of the totality of the legislative framework codified in Helms-Burton and related statutory provisions so that the United States may finally develop a coherent policy toward the Island.